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SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT – JUSTICE COMMITTEE 
 
FAMILY LAW (SCOTLAND) ACT 2006 
 
Evidence of  
Professor Elizabeth B. Crawford,  
Professor Emeritus of International Private Law  
and  
Professor Janeen M. Carruthers,  
Professor of Private Law,  
University of Glasgow 
 
Our evidence is restricted to provisions of the 2006 Act pertaining to international private law 
or having international private law implications.  
 
Section 2 – Void Marriages  
Section 38(2) of the 2006 Act directs the question whether a person has consented to enter 
into a marriage to the law of the domicile of that person immediately before the marriage. 
While this provision made clear the rule in the general case, the inclusion in section 2 of a 
particular rule concerning void marriages (inserted as s.20A of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 
1977) represented an attempt to address a problem which had troubled the Scots courts in this 
area.  
 
Insofar as section 2 introduced a mandatory provision of the lex loci celebrationis, where the 
lex loci is Scottish, it was, and continues to be, a welcome measure. Given the absence of 
reported case law on the interpretation and operation of the section, it is difficult to comment 
further.  It is reasonable to infer that the problem demonstrated in Hakeem v Hussain, 2003 
S.L.T. 515 (on appeal, sub nom. SH v KH, 2005 S.L.T. 1025) has been addressed effectively. 
 
 
Section 15 – Postponement of decree of divorce where religious impediment to remarry 
exists  
Section 15, making provision for Scotland equivalent to the Divorce (Religious Marriages) 
Act 2002 for England and Wales, was, and continues to be, a welcome measure. 
 
 
Section 19 – Special destinations: revocation on divorce or annulment  
We note that section 19 has been repealed by section 2 (“Effect of divorce, dissolution or 
annulment on special destination”) of the Succession (Scotland) Act 2016. 
 
 
Section 21 – Abolition of status of illegitimacy; and Section 41 – Effect of parents' 
marriage in determining status to depend on law of domicile 
Section 21 purported to abolish the status of illegitimacy. Section 21(2)(a) enacts a 
substitution in the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986  (s.1: legal equality of 
children) in the following words: 
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“No person whose status is governed by Scots law shall be illegitimate; and 
accordingly the fact that a person’s parents are not or have not been married to each 
other shall be left out of account in— 
(a) determining the person’s legal status; or 
(b) establishing the legal relationship between the person and any other person.” 
 
This begs the question of when a person’s status is governed by Scots law. There is a 
mutually dependent relationship between domicile and status, domicile being ascribed at birth 
according to status, but (until the advent of the 2006 Act in Scotland, and still in England) the 
status of the individual being required to be identified before domicile can be ascribed. 
Identification of domicile of origin depended upon legitimacy, but, as domicile of origin 
determined status, legitimacy depended upon domicile. There was, therefore, a problem of 
circularity of reasoning. 
 
Since, in terms of section 22 of the 2006 Act, the domicile of a child at birth must be ascribed 
by a Scots court according to the rules contained therein, and not according to status as having 
been born inside marriage or not, one must conclude that if, in terms of s.22, a child’s 
domicile is Scots, his status cannot be one of illegitimacy.  
 
But if, by s.22, his domicile is found to be other than Scots, his status must be determined by 
that other personal law, which yet may contain a distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate. The 2006 Act, in section 41, acknowledges this in providing that any question 
arising as to the effect on a person’s status of— (a) the person's parents being, or having been, 
married to each other; or (b) the person's parents not being, or not having been, married to 
each other, shall be determined by the law of the country in which the person is domiciled at 
the time at which the question arises. 
 
Whether the status of illegitimacy by a foreign legal system (such as the law of a title1 or the 
lex situs of immoveable property) would be found to be against Scots public policy would 
depend upon the matter being capable of being raised in a Scots forum, and upon the context 
in which the matter arose. The very existence of section 41 suggests that a foreign status of 
illegitimacy, per se, would not offend Scots public policy.  
 
 
Section 22 – Domicile of persons under 16 
Section 22 was enacted to assist in the fulfilment of one of the aims of the 2006 Act, namely, 
the removal from the law of Scotland of the status of illegitimacy. In Scots law, there could 
no longer be a link between a child’s domicile and the marital status of his/her parents. 
 
There has been no reported case on the interpretation and operation of section 22. Even so, a 
flaw in the provision is that the Act makes no reference to the terms “domicile of origin” and 
“domicile of choice”, which are pivotal concepts in the law of domicile. Section 22 is an ad 
hoc statutory incursion into the framework of the domicile rules, and silence about the place 
of ‘under-16 domicile’ in the general scheme of domicile rules is damaging to their 
coherence. Legislating under the heading “Domicile of persons under 16”, without 
                                                          
1 Preserved by Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (Commencement, Transitional Provisions and 
Savings) Order 2006 (SSI 2006/212), art.11. 
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appreciating the potential repercussions of the provision on the ascertainment of domicile at 
subsequent points in an individual’s life, was ill-advised.  
 
A second criticism is that the Act does not make plain the time at which the section 22 rule is 
to take effect. Does it apply (in cases litigated from its date of commencement - 4 May 2006 -  
forward), to regulate the domiciles only of those persons who, at the date of coming into force 
of the Act, were under 16 and those at that date not yet born? Or does it apply equally to 
determine the ultimate domicile of an octogenarian propositus who dies after commencement 
of the Act? The point is yet untested and ought to be clarified.  
 
 
Section 25 – Meaning of “cohabitant” in sections 26 to 29  
The Act, in sections 25 – 30, introduced a set of rules which provide for cohabitants certain 
property rights during and at the termination of cohabitation. 
 
The statutory meaning of “cohabitant”, as enacted, was as follows: either member of a couple 
consisting of (a) a man and a woman who are (or were) living together as if they were 
husband and wife; or (b) two persons of the same sex who are (or were) living together as if 
they were civil partners. By section 4(2) and (3) of the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014, section 25(1)(a) of the 2006 Act must be read now as extending equally 
to two people of the same sex who are (or were) living together as if they were married to 
each other.  
 
These notable changes in domestic family law have the potential to generate conflict of laws 
problems, but in general sections 25–30 are “conflict of laws blind”, except as regards section 
29 (see below). It is implicit that application may be made for the rights provided for in the 
Act whenever Scots law is the lex causae. However, since generally the Act contains no 
jurisdiction or choice of law rules with regard to de facto cohabitation, it remains uncertain, 
e.g. which law governs an individual’s legal capacity to attain the status of cohabitant, or 
indeed when Scots law is to be considered the lex causae. An essential antecedent question, 
not addressed in the Act, is in what circumstances the Scottish courts have jurisdiction to rule 
on these matters in the first place. 
 
What arguments might a party approaching the Scots court deploy to persuade the court that a 
law other than Scots law should apply, assuming such other law is furnished with rules 
containing property rights for cohabitants? Arguably, the starting point might be that Scots 
law is the governing law where the parties have, or last had, their principal place of 
cohabitation in Scotland, i.e. a simple territorial basis akin to the “matrimonial domicile”. 
There is a strong argument for application, by the court of the country in which the parties 
cohabit, of the law of that country to the property and financial consequences of de facto 
cohabitation. Presumably that law also would determine when, and in what circumstances, 
such cohabitation is deemed to have ceased. 
 
It is unfortunate, therefore, that, with the exception of section 29, this set of provisions for 
cohabitants lacks any indication of its applicability in cross-border terms.  
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Section 29 – Application to court by survivor for provision on intestacy 
This provision, unlike section 28, has the merit of specifying a choice of law connecting 
factor, namely, that for an application to be made for succession rights under the Act the 
deceased cohabitant must have been domiciled in Scotland at death.  
 
The Sheriff Principal decided in Kerr v Mangan,2 upon the interpretation of section 29, that 
while it “innovates” on the manner in which the estate of a deceased cohabitant falls to be 
distributed, it ought to be read against the background of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, 
and in accordance with existing principles of international private law. Therefore, “references 
to the ‘net intestate estate’ of the deceased … ought to be interpreted as meaning the net 
intestate estate that is to devolve according to Scots law including Scots private international 
law …”.3 Hence ‘net intestate estate’ for the purpose of the 2006 Act did not extend to 
immoveable property situated outside Scotland. The argument of counsel for the appellant 
that section 29 of the 2006 Act did not fall to be applied as part of the Scots law of 
succession, but rather was an independent and novel scheme, covering all the estate of the 
deceased wherever situate, failed to convince the court. The court’s decision is consistent with 
Scots conflict of laws principles in property and succession. 
 
 
Section 37 – Jurisdiction: actions for declarator of recognition of certain foreign decrees 
This continues to be an appropriate provision for use where there is doubt as to the validity in 
Scotland of a foreign, non-EU consistorial judgment.  
 
 
Section 38 – Validity of marriages 
 
Formal validity of marriage: section 38(1) is a statutory crystallisation of the pre-existing 
common law, and to that extent is unexceptionable. However, one reported case in the period 
since 2006, namely, A v K,4  has shown that occasionally there may be difficulty in applying 
the ‘lex loci celebrationis’ rule. The case concerned the formal validity of a marriage 
purportedly concluded by telephone between parties, one of whom was in Scotland and the 
other in Pakistan. Lord Stewart in the Outer House of the Court of Session, refusing a 
declarator of nullity, took the view that the marriage took place wholly in Pakistan.5  
 
In such an unusual ‘dual locality’ case, we suggest that the choice of law rule should be one 
of cumulative application, in the same way as occurs with regard to the essential validity of 
marriage per section 38(2) of the 2006 Act. Such an approach, which we have recommended 
elsewhere,6 was commended in England in SB v The Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions (BB).7 
                                                          
2 2013 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 102. Affirmed by the Court of Session at 2015 S.C. 17. 
3 Ibid, para.23 per Sheriff Principal RA Dunlop QC. 
4 2011 S.L.T. 873. 
5 [58]. 
6 E.B.Crawford and J.M.Carruthers, 'Dual locality events: marriage by telephone' 2011 SLT (News) 
227-234; and E.B.Crawford and J.M.Carruthers, International Private Law – A Scots Perspective, 4th 
edition (2015), W.Green, para 11-21. 
7 [2014] UKUT 0495 (AAC), at [40]. See also the decision of the Court of Appeal in KC v City of 
Westminster Social and Community Services Department [2008] EWCA Civ 198, where a marriage 
ceremony was conducted by telephone call between one party (a British national of Bangladeshi 
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Essential validity of a marriage: section 38(2)(a), in stating that the question whether a 
person who enters into a marriage had capacity to enter into it shall be determined by the law 
of the place where, immediately before the marriage, that person was domiciled, affirms in 
statutory form the common law approach. In so doing, it appears to exclude the possibility in 
Scotland of advancing an alternative argument on choice of law (the ‘intended matrimonial 
home theory’ or ‘common law exception’) which might produce an in favorem matrimonii 
result where application of the dual domicile theory would yield a negative, i.e. a finding of 
lack of capacity on the part of either or both parties. No cases have been reported on the 
operation of section 38(2), and so it may be conjectured that the fixed nature of the rule is not 
causing difficulty in practice. 
 
Third party consent to marriage: section 38(5). There are no reported cases concerning 
section 38(5). Issues of parental consent to underage marriage now are practically unknown, 
but the statutory rule – though convoluted in its terms – probably should remain.  
 
 
Section 39 – Matrimonial property 
Scots applicable law rules of matrimonial property were placed on a legislative footing by 
section 39. The need for this was not pressing (and insofar as we know, there have been no 
reported cases concerning section 39). The drafting of the section is unclear in various places. 
 
The first point to be made is that the provision admits only at the end (section 39(6)(b)) that 
the rules in section 39 are subject to the spouses’ contrary agreement. It is, therefore, apparent 
that these rules do not trump private marriage contract provisions. It is assumed that the 
provisions contained in section 39 are subject also to rights which have vested under a 
statutory scheme (though it has to be conceded that the Act nowhere makes such a specific 
assertion). It would be clearer if the rule admitted in the opening clause that the provisions 
contained in section 39 are subject to contrary private agreement or vested statutory 
provisions. 
 
By section 39(2), the rights of spouses to each other’s moveable property arising by virtue of 
the marriage shall be determined by the law of the common domicile. The relevant time at 
which domicile is to be ascertained is not specified: is the reference to the domicile of the 
spouses at the date of acquisition of the property in question, or to the immediate post-nuptial 
domicile? For sake of clarity, a tempus inspiciendum (i.e. the time at which domicile is 
relevant) ought to be specified.  
 
Section 39(3), in our view, is unclear. By section 39(3), where the parties are domiciled in 
different countries (when?), the spouses shall be taken to have the same rights in each other’s 
moveable property arising by virtue of the marriage as they had immediately before the 
marriage (by which law?). This obscure provision is subject also to the provision on vested 
rights contained in section 39(5). It may mean that the parties are to be taken to have adopted 
                                                                                                                                                                      
descent, and an English domiciliary) and the second party, a woman of presumed Bangladeshi 
domicile. For the purposes of the case, the marriage was accepted to have taken place in Bangladesh, 
by the law of which it was formally valid. 
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for the future the matrimonial property rules existing in their respective ante-nuptial 
domiciles; but what if these systems are mutually inconsistent? 
 
If section 39 is to remain, its drafting should be made more precise in order to remove 
ambiguity. 
 
 
Section 40 – Aliment 
 
The UK decision not to participate in the 2007 Hague Protocol on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations reflects the UK Government’s view that in maintenance cases the 
expense of proving the content of foreign law would be disproportionate to the value of the 
great majority of maintenance claims. The UK agreed to participate in the Maintenance 
Regulation only on the basis that applicable law rules were removed from the EU instrument; 
and further that EC accession to the 2007 Protocol would be done on the basis that the UK 
was not obliged to participate therein. Accordingly, where a Scots court has jurisdiction in 
respect of a maintenance claim, it will apply Scots domestic law to the substance of the 
question. This means that the substance of section 40 requires no alteration.  
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